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Income classification shifting is identified as the third form of earnings management that managers 
use, in addition to accrual-based and real earnings management.  Income classification shifting is 
arguably less costly than the other two forms of earnings management (McVay 2006; Abernathy 
et al. 2014).  However, there is a potential cost of classification shifting - the higher likelihood of 
missing the market expectations in subsequent periods because shifted core earnings of the current 
period 1) could bias upward analysts' forecasts for the subsequent periods and 2) would recur as 
core expenses unless firms can continuously shift their core expenses to special items in future 
periods. This paper hypothesizes that when firms have special items that allow them to shift income 
consecutively, they are more likely to engage in classification shifting by consecutively shifting, 
reducing potential costs. Consistent with expectations, the findings show that firms which report 
special items that tend to continue over multiple quarters (continuous special items) are more likely 
to classification shift than firms that report special items which tend not to continue over multiple 
quarters (non-continuous special items). Furthermore, this study documents that the difference in 
the likelihood of shifting between continuous and non-continuous special items is more 
pronounced for the first but not the last occurrence of a series of the same special item across time.  
The findings highlight the potential cost of classification shifting and its impact on a firm’s shifting 
behavior and offer valuable insight for investors and auditors when they assess the likelihood of 
classification shifting and the quality of earnings.     
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THE CONTINUITY OF SPECIAL ITEMS AND THE LIKELIHOOD OF INCOME 
CLASSIFICATION SHIFTING  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This study examines whether firms are more likely to income classification shift when they 
report special items that allow them to shift income consecutively. Income classification shifting 
refers to management’s attempt to boost core earnings through the intentional misclassification of 
core expenses, such as cost of goods sold and selling and administrative (operating) expenses, into 
non-core items, including special items and discontinued operations. An example is recording 
severance pay due to routine retirements and terminations as part of a restructuring charge.  Prior 
studies state that income classification shifting has advantages over other earnings management 
tools such as accrual management and real earnings management. For example, McVay (2006) 
posits that unlike accrual management and real earnings management, which can affect future 
earnings, income classification shifting will not affect future bottom-line earnings since  
classification shifting simply involves reporting regular operating expenses as non-recurring 
special items or discontinued operations. In addition, because income classification shifting does 
not change net income, it is potentially subject to less scrutiny by auditors and regulators than 
accrual and real earnings management, which do affect net income.  
However, income classification shifting may incur a potential cost - the higher likelihood 
of missing market expectations in subsequent periods.1 Managers engage in classification shifting 
                                                          
1 McVay (2006) did recognize that all three types of earnings management increase future earnings expectations but 
suggested that the adverse impact of heightened earnings targets for income classification shifting is much less because 
future earnings will be the same when firms classification shift income; whereas accruals management and real 
earnings management will further reduce earnings. However, we highlight the fact that classification shifting increases 
the market expectation of “core” earnings, which will be lower in the future when core expenses recur absent any 
additional classification shifting.  We highlight the potential cost of missing market expectations of core earnings due 
to classification shifting and provide evidence that concerns with this cost play a role in management’s decision to 
classification shift.    
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to influence analysts and investors’ perceptions of a company’s core earnings. By classifying 
current quarter core operating expenses as non-core special items, managers attempt to increase 
core earnings used by analysts and investors to forecast future earnings and value a firm.2  If 
managers succeed in managing analysts’ perception of core earnings for the current period, 
however, they could face a higher target to meet or beat in the subsequent periods because analysts’ 
forecasts for subsequent periods may be based on shifted core earnings of the current period. 
Consequently, firms that successfully manage analysts’ perceptions of current quarter core 
earnings to meet or beat their earnings targets in the current period may face higher market 
expectations in future periods. Another drawback of using classification shifting to meet market 
expectations in the current period is that shifted core expenses are likely to recur as core expenses 
in future periods. As a result, when core expenses recur in subsequent periods, firms may face a 
double whammy - lower core earnings and higher earnings expectations, resulting in a higher 
likelihood of missing earnings targets in future periods.  
We classify a firm as a classification shifter if it has positive quarterly unexpected core 
earnings and its quarterly analyst earnings per share forecast is greater than the firm’s quarterly 
basic earnings per share (Athanasakou et al. 2011; Abernathy et al. 2014).  Given the significant 
adverse market reaction when firms miss market expectations (Kasznik and McNichols 2002; 
Skinner and Sloan 2002; Rees and Sivaramakrishnan 2007), managers are less likely to engage in 
income classification shifting in the current period if they anticipate a higher likelihood of missing 
market expectations in future periods.  However, firms can reduce such potential costs of 
classification shifting if they can consecutively shift income across time. Since firms typically shift 
                                                          
2 For brevity, we often use the term ‘special items’ to mean both special items and discontinued operations. 
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core expenses to non-recurring special items, whether they can continue to shift income in 
subsequent periods can depend on whether they can report special items consecutively.3  
Although, by definition, special items are supposed to be infrequent or unusual, some 
special items are likely to continue over multiple quarters while others are likely to occur only in 
one or two quarters.4 Therefore, whether firms can continue to shift their income in subsequent 
periods may depend on whether they can report special items consecutively. Thus, if managers 
evaluate the costs and benefits before they engage in income classification shifting, they may be 
more likely to classification shift when they have special items that allow them to shift their income 
consecutively and reduce the potential cost of classification shifting.  
We examine whether firms are more likely to shift their income when they report special 
items that are likely to continue over multiple quarters than special items that are not likely to 
continue over multiple quarters. Thus, we classify special items components and discontinued 
operations provided by Compustat into continuous special items and non-continuous special items. 
Specifically, we classify discontinued operations, restructuring charges, and acquisition/merger 
costs as continuous special items and all other special items as non-continuous special items.5  
We find that firms are more likely to shift their income when they report continuous special 
items than non-continuous special items, indicating that firms weigh the costs of income 
classification shifting in their decision to shift. Also, when we examine series of specific 
continuous and non-continuous special items, we find that firms are more likely to shift their 
                                                          
3 Even if a firm can shift core expenses into a special item consecutively, the special item will likely only continue 
for a small number of quarters.  However, the ability to shift income consecutively allows the firm to ‘buy time’ 
until financial performance improves or until it has future earnings management opportunities. 
4 For example, discontinued operations, acquisition/merger-related costs, and restructuring costs are related to 
organizational changes that take time to execute and implement. These special items tend to occur over multiple 
quarters. In contrast, the sale of assets that results in gains or losses or asset write-downs typically occur in one 
quarter.  
5 For details on the components of COMPUSTAT special items, please see Appendix 2. 
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income in a quarter when the special item is the first in a series of continuous special items than 
when it is the first in a series of non-continuous special items. On the other hand, for special items 
that occur last in a series of specific special items, we find no significant difference in the 
likelihood of classification shifting between continuous and non-continuous special items. These 
results indicate that firms consider the potential costs of classification shifting and are more likely 
to undertake classification shifting when the special items allow them to shift consecutively to 
reduce such costs.   
Our study contributes to the literature on income classification shifting. Prior studies 
document the existence of income classification shifting (McVay 2006; Fan et al. 2010; Barua et 
al. 2010; Haw et al. 2011) and the market’s mispricing of income classification shifting (Alfonso 
et al. 2015), suggesting that managers appear to exploit the benefits of classification shifting. 
However, there is little discussion on the cost of classification shifting and its implication for 
management’s decision to engage in classification shifting.  Our study shows that managers are 
more likely to shift income when they can reduce the potential costs of missing analysts’ 
expectations in subsequent periods by shifting their income through continuous special items.  
This research also offers valuable insights for investors and auditors when they assess the 
likelihood of income classification shifting and the quality of earnings. Income classification 
shifting and the reporting of special items have increased significantly in recent years (Cain et al. 
2019; see Table 2, Panel C of our paper). However, the capital market and its participants do not 
fully understand the composition of special items and income classification shifting (Alfonso et 
al. 2015, Pan et al. 2019). Knowing incentives and circumstances in which firms are likely to 
engage in classification shifting will help financial statement users assess the likelihood of 
classification shifting and to analyze special items. Our findings indicate that when firms report 
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continuous special items, especially when a specific continuous special item appears first in a 
consecutive string, firms are more likely to engage in classification shifting.                 
In addition, our study provides an explanation for why firms that report discontinued 
operations and restructuring charges are more likely to engage in income classification shifting 
(Kinney and Trezevant 1997; Barua et al. 2010). Our findings suggest that firms face lower 
potential costs of income classification shifting when they report discontinued operations or 
restructuring charges because those special items are more likely to occur continuously over 
multiple quarters, allowing firms to shift income consecutively.    
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides background information and 
a literature review. Section 3 develops our hypotheses. Section 4 describes the research design and 
section 5 provides information on the sample selection and descriptive statistics.  Section 6 
explains the main results while section 7 offers additional results.  Finally, section 8 concludes. 
 
2. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The FASB states that the objective of financial reporting is to provide financial information 
that is useful to investors and creditors in making decisions regarding providing resources to an 
entity (SFAC No 8, FASB 2010). To make decisions, users of financial information rely directly 
or indirectly on an assessment of the reporting entity’s future net cash inflows.  Financial 
statements provide much of the information needed to assess future net cash inflows (FASB 2010).  
When reporting entities prepare financial statements, they categorize and present data into line 
items and subtotals, over which management has significant discretion. The FASB’s proposed 
Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts (SFAC) No. 8, Chapter 7 (Presentation), Paragraph 
36, states that creating line items that include classes of items that are close to homogenous is a 
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critical aspect of presentation.  It also posits that homogeneity enhances the ability to represent 
line items (FASB, 2016).6  However, the homogeneity of line items is mainly under management’s 
discretion.    
How line items are categorized and presented on an income statement has significant 
influence on a firm’s valuation (Lipe 1986; Ohlson and Penman 1992; Fairfield et al. 1996; 
Alfonso et al. 2015). Once management provides an income statement, users arrange line items, 
subtotals, and totals in a way that they believe is most useful in assessing future cash flows and 
earnings (Bradshaw and Sloan 2002; Gu and Chen, 2004).  Prior literature documents that the 
capital market tends to weigh persistent earnings components more in firm valuation than 
transitory earnings components (Lipe 1986; Elliott and Shaw 1996; Bradshaw and Sloan 2002). 
Thus, it is an essential task for users of income statements to distinguish persistent earnings 
components from transitory earnings components. Academia and Computstat often classify these 
transitory earnings components as special items (Gu and Chen, 2004; McVay 2006). Prior studies 
on special items show that they are different from more persistent earnings components in relation 
to future earnings and firm valuation (Elliott and Hanna, 1996; Fairfield et al., 1996). The 
presentation of an income statement that distinguishes special items from more persistent earnings 
components such as cost of goods sold and operating expenses is indeed informative for users to 
assess the predictability of earnings and to value a firm (Fairfield et al. 1996; Burgstahler et al. 
2002). These findings support the informative view of the reporting of special items. In addition to 
special items as defined in Compustat, discontinued operation gains and losses is a transitory item.  
Accounting standards require discontinued operations to be reported separately from income from 
continuing operations (SFAS No. 144 (now ASC 205-20)).   
                                                          
6 https://asc.fasb.org/imageRoot/88/89617388.pdf 
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In contrast to the informative view of reporting special items, the opportunistic view of 
reporting special items argues that managers use special items to manage earnings and/or the 
perception of earnings. Both Kinney and Trezevant (1997) and Reidl and Srinivasan (2010) find 
that firms are more likely to aggregate income increasing special items with other items on one 
line in the income statement and report the individual income-increasing items in the footnotes. 
On the other hand, firms are more likely to report income decreasing special items in the income 
statement as separate line items to emphasize the transitory nature of those items. Givoly and Hayn 
(1996) document that firms report income-decreasing discretionary or semi-discretionary special 
items when earnings excluding those special items has declined significantly, supporting a big bath 
hypothesis. On the other hand, they use positive semi-discretionary special items such as gains on 
the sale of assets to smooth declining earnings. McVay (2006) shows that income classification 
shifting is more prevalent to meet analysts’ forecast benchmarks.  
Income classification shifting refers to management’s attempt to boost core earnings 
through the intentional misclassification of core expenses, such as cost of goods sold and selling 
and administrative (operating) expenses, into non-core items, including special items and 
discontinued operations. Such income classification shifting has been recognized as the third form 
of earnings management, in addition to accruals management and real earnings management. 
Research has documented management’s income classification shifting behavior. For instance, 
drawing on annual U.S. data, McVay (2006) develops a model to estimate unexpected core 
earnings and finds a positive relationship between unexpected annual core earnings and income-
decreasing special items. This suggests that core expenses are shifted to special items to inflate 
core earnings. Fan et al. (2010) extend McVay (2006) to quarterly earnings and document that 
classification shifting is more prominent in the fourth quarter than in interim quarters. Barua et al. 
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(2010) show that management shifts core expenses to income-decreasing discontinued operations 
to inflate core earnings. As an earnings management apparatus, income classification shifting is 
used to meet analysts’ earnings forecasts (McVay 2006; Barua et al. 2010; Fan et al. 2010; 
Athanasakou et al. 2011; Cain et al. 2019).7  
Income classification shifting literature emphasizes the advantages of classification 
shifting as an earnings management tool over accrual-based and real earnings management 
(McVay 2006; Fan et al. 2010; Barua et al. 2010). First, classification shifting does not affect 
GAAP net income. Therefore, it may be less likely to draw attention from auditors and regulators. 
Second, classification shifting does not affect real business activities, which might reduce future 
earnings. As McVay (2006) states, “Classification shifting bears a relatively low cost: there is no 
accrual that later reverses, nor are there lost revenues from forgone opportunities.” (p. 505) 
Consistent with this view, Abernathy et al. (2014) document that managers use classification 
shifting as a substitute for both accrual-based and real earnings management. Little, however, has 
been discussed on the potential cost of income classification shifting and its implication on firms’ 
income classification shifting decisions.  
 One potential cost of income classification shifting is the higher likelihood of missing 
expectations in subsequent periods. By classifying current quarter core operating expenses as non-
core special items, managers attempt to increase core earnings used by investors and analysts to 
value a firm and to forecast future earnings.  However, if the firm is successful at influencing 
investors and analysts, then investors’ valuation and analysts’ forecasts for upcoming periods will 
likely be higher.  Haw et al. (2011), using a sample from East Asian countries, show that investors 
react positively to abnormally high core earnings surrounding the earnings announcement but 
                                                          
7 Fan et al. (2010) also find that classification shifting is used to meet zero earnings and one-year ago same quarter 
earnings.  
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negatively to them during the following year.  Their findings indicate that investors are fooled by 
overstated core earnings due to classification shifting around the earnings announcement but later 
adjust as they recognize inflated core earnings.  McVay (2006) and Alfonso et al. (2015), using 
U.S. samples, also document negative abnormal stock returns for classification shifters for the 
following year.  Alfonso et al. (2015) find that the market’s expectation of core earnings 
persistence is higher than the actual core earnings persistence for the following year for 
classification shifters, but not for non-shifters. Pan et al. (2019) document that shifted core earnings 
of the current period is likely to bias upward analysts' forecasts for the subsequent periods. Overall, 
most of the prior literature studying the effect of classification shifting on the stock market has 
suggested that the market and analysts perceive, at least initially, shifted core earnings as a base 
for firm valuation and analysts’ forecasts of future earnings. Consequently, firms that successfully 
manage analysts’ perceptions of current quarter core earnings to meet or beat their earnings 
estimates are likely to face higher market and earnings expectations in future periods. In addition, 
when the shifted core expenses in the current quarter recur in subsequent periods, firms face a 
double whammy - lower actual core earnings and higher earnings expectations in the future 
periods.   
Indeed, influencing analysts’ expectations has stock market implications.  Prior studies 
document that analysts’ expectations are considered the most important earnings targets for 
managers (Brown and Caylor 2005), and capital markets reward (penalize) firms when they meet 
or beat (miss) forecasts (Kasznik and McNichols 2002; Skinner and Sloan 2002; Rees and 
Sivaramakrishnan 2007).     
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Managers choose earnings management tools based on the costs and benefits of those tools 
(Zhang 2012; Abernathy et al. 2014). If managers expect that the cost of income classification 
shifting is higher than its benefits, they are unlikely to engage in income classification shifting. 
However, such potential cost of classification shifting can be reduced if firms can continue to shift 
their income in the subsequent periods. Since firms tend to shift core expenses to special items, 
the ability of firms to shift income in subsequent periods will likely depend significantly on 
whether they can report those special items in upcoming periods. Although special items are 
supposed to be infrequent or unusual, some special items may continue over multiple quarters 
while others are likely to occur for only one or two quarters. Therefore, whether firms can continue 
to shift their income in subsequent quarters depends on whether they report special items that allow 
them to shift income continuously in future periods. Consequently, if firms evaluate the costs and 
benefits of income classification shifting before they engage in it, they are more likely to undertake 
income classification shifting when they can continue to report special items in the subsequent 
periods.  Figure 1 illustrates the potential costs of income classification shifting and how 
continuous special items can reduce such costs. 
  
3. HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
The evidence that income classification shifting can be used to meet analysts’ expectations 
suggests that analysts cannot or will not correctly identify all shifted core expenses in their 
forecasts (McVay 2006; Fan et al. 2010; Athanasakou et al. 2011; Pan et al. 2019). Consequently, 
their earnings forecasts for an income classification shifter may be based on its inflated core 
earnings for the current period. At the same time, when core expenses recur in the next quarter, a 
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shifter’s core earnings tend to be lower if the shifter cannot continue its shifting activity, everything 
else equal.  
Interestingly, research has shown that analysts expect management to use discretion to 
bring the earnings numbers up to expectations.  Thus, failure to meet the target sends an 
unfavorable signal about a firm's prospects (Jong et al. 2014). As a result, firms face repercussions 
when they miss analysts’ earnings benchmarks (Kasznik and McNichols 2002; Skinner and Sloan 
2002; Rees and Sivaramakrishnan 2007).  This can be a cost from income classification shifting 
in current quarter q because classification shifting can increase analysts’ earnings expectations in 
quarter q+1.  However, such a potential cost of classification shifting can be reduced if a firm can 
continue to shift its income in quarter q+1.  
Although special items are transitory to some degree, the various special items are not the 
same in terms of continuity. Some special items are likely to continue over a number of quarters 
while others are likely to be reported in only one quarter. For instance, it may take several quarters 
for a firm to complete a restructuring of its business or to phase out a business segment. On the 
other hand, firms are less likely to report gains and losses on the sales of operating assets over 
multiple quarters. If firms have special items that continue over multiple quarters, their managers 
are less likely to be concerned about the potential costs of income classification shifting from 
missing market expectations in quarter q+1 since they can shift their income consecutively in 
subsequent quarters . Thus, our first hypothesis is as follows.   
H1: Firms that report special items that are likely to continue over multiple quarters 
(continuous special items) are more likely to engage in income classification shifting 
than firms that report special items that are not likely to continue over multiple 
quarters (non-continuous special items). 
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We classify special items into continuous and non-continuous categories to investigate 
whether managers are more likely to engage in income classification shifting given the potential 
cost of classification shifting. However, the differential likelihood of income classification shifting 
with continuous and non-continuous special items could be due to other characteristics of those 
special items. Although special items have some common characteristics such as being less 
persistent and less related to core operating activities, they are not all equal. Such differential 
characteristics among special items affect how firms report special items and use them to manage 
earnings. For example, Givoly and Hayn (1996) classify special items by the degree of discretion 
that managers can exert in terms of timing and magnitude and find that discretionary and semi-
discretionary special items are used to manage earnings.8 Kinney and Trezevant (1997) employ 
the classification scheme developed by Givoly and Hayn (1996) and find similar results.  McVay 
(2006) classifies special items into shiftable and non-shiftable special items and finds that firms 
are more likely to engage in income classification shifting when they report shiftable special 
items.9  Thus, the higher likelihood of classification shifting with continuous special items may be 
explained by continuous special items being more discretionary or more shiftable.    
To address this alternative explanation of the results of the hypothesis 1 test, we perform 
an additional test.  We examine continuous and non-continuous special items by their reporting 
timing in a series of the same type of special item (e.g., restructuring charge, discontinued 
                                                          
8 They classify special items into three groups based on the degree of managerial discretion in timing and 
magnitude. Examples of non-discretionary special items are litigation settlements and foreign currency translation 
gains and losses while gains and losses on the sale of operating assets and investments, and inventory liquidation 
gains/losses are examples of semi-discretionary special items.  Examples of discretionary special items are 
restructuring charges and asset write-offs.     
9 McVay (2006) argues that certain special items are more susceptible to classification shifting than others. 
Specifically, she classifies restructuring charges and merger-related costs as shiftable special items and all other 
special items as non-shiftable special items. While whether special items are shiftable affects the feasibility to shift 
income, it does not affect the cost of classification shifting. Our finding that the continuity of special items affects 
the likelihood of income classification shifting provides evidence of management’s concern for classification 
shifting’s potential costs.    
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operations) across time and examine the likelihood of income classification shifting. If the 
likelihood of classification shifting is simply because continuous special items share some 
characteristics of discretionary and/or shiftable special items, the likelihood of income 
classification shifting will not differ based on the timing in a series of the special item (e.g., 
whether it appears during the first period or last period in the series).  However, if managers do 
consider the potential costs of classification shifting and want to reduce such costs by shifting 
continuous special items, the likelihood of income classification shifting can differ by the reporting 
timing in a series of a continuous or a non-continuous special item.  Thus, we state hypothesis 2 
as follows.   
H2-a: Firms are more likely to engage in income classification shifting in a quarter when 
a continuous special item is reported first in a series of the special item than when 
a non-continuous special item is reported first in a series of the special item. 
 H2-b: Firms are not more likely to engage in income classification shifting in a quarter 
when the a continuous special item is reported  last in a series of the special item 
than when a non-continuous special item is reported last in a series of the special 
item. 
 
4. RESEARCH DESIGN 
4.1 Proxy for Income Classification Shifting 
We first estimate a firm’s expected quarterly core earnings using the Fan et al. (2010) 
model as follows (for brevity, we exclude the firm subscript i): 
CEq = β0 + β1CEq-1 + β2CEq-4 + β3ATOq + β4ACCRq-1 + β5ACCRq-4 + β6ΔSALESq  
 
          + β7NEG_ΔSALESq + β8RETq + β9RETq-1 + εq.                                                    (1).    
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In equation (1), CEq is core earnings, where q represents quarter q.  Core earnings are sales minus 
both cost of goods sold and selling, general and administrative expenses, scaled by sales.  ATOq 
is the asset turnover ratio and ACCRq-1 and ACCRq-4 are lagged operating accruals. ∆Salesq is 
percentage change in sales from quarter q-4 to quarter q whereas NEG_∆SALESq is the percentage 
change in sales if ∆Salesq is negative, and 0 otherwise.  RETq and RETq-1 are CRSP three-month 
value-weighted market-adjusted returns corresponding to the current and prior fiscal quarter, 
respectively.  Table 1 gives detailed definitions of the variables used in this paper.10 
We estimate equation (1) for each industry11-quarter excluding firm i over the fiscal years 
1997 to 2016.12  We then compute firm i’s unexpected core earnings (UE_CEi,q) as the difference 
between the firm-quarter actual core earnings (CEi,q) and the predicted industry-quarter core 
earnings from the model (1).  We classify a firm quarter as classification shifting (SHIFTq = 1) if 
it has positive unexpected core earnings in quarter q (UE_CEi,q) and its quarter q IBES earnings 
per share is greater than GAAP basic earnings per share (Athanasakou et al. 2011; Abernathy et 
al. 2014).  Firms shift core expenses to non-core items to boost core earnings.  I/B/E/S reports 
earnings that often exclude non-core items.  Shifters’ I/B/E/S earnings are expected to be higher 
than their GAAP earnings because shifters non-core earnings would tend to be biased downward.  
Indeed, Bradshaw and Sloan (2002) show that beginning around 1990, I/B/E/S earnings tend to 
exceed GAAP earnings for firms in general, which implies that the (mostly non-core) items 
excluded from I/B/E/S earnings are on average income decreasing.  
 
 
                                                          
10 All variables used in our regressions, except for indicator variables, are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles to 
control for outliers. 
11 We use the Fama-French (1997) 48 industry classifications for our analyses. 
12 We need to go back to 1996 to retrieve variables for quarters q-1 and q-4. 
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4.2 Continuous and Non-Continuous Special Items   
We classify special items into continuous special items and non-continuous special items. 
Specifically, we consider special items and discontinued operations reported in Compustat. 
Compustat offers detailed descriptions of the components of special items and discontinued 
operations. We classify discontinued operations (DOQ), acquisition/merger-related costs (AQP), 
and restructuring costs (RCP) as continuous special items and the nine remaining special items as 
non-continuous special items. The three continuous special items, DOQ, AQP, and RCP, are 
related to organizational changes that take time to execute and implement. Thus, these special 
items are likely to occur consecutively over multiple quarters.  Accounting treatments for these 
items reflect such characteristics of these activities. For example, the FASB provides a specific 
accounting treatment when a firm cannot complete discontinued operations within an accounting 
period, indicating that discontinued operations take time to complete and occur over multiple 
quarters (SFAS No. 144 (now ASC 205-20)).  
To check the validity of our classification of continuous and non-continuous special 
items, we examine the continuity of special items using the universe of the Compustat Industrial 
Quarterly file from 1997-2016. Appendix 2  reports the count and percentage of firm-quarters 
with a new special item in the current quarter that continue to have the same type of special item 
in the following quarter(s), as well as the average number of quarters that the special item lasts. 
A firm quarter is considered to have a new special item if that special item is not reported in the 
previous quarter. We report this result for firm-quarters with special items (SPIQ), firm-quarters 
with discontinued operations (DOQ), and firm-quarters with one of the specific types of 
Compustat special items. In terms of the reoccurrence in consecutive quarters, discontinued 
operations (DOQ) ranks first at 70% and lasts an average of 5.91 quarters. Acquisitions and 
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mergers (AQPQ) comes next at 50% and lasts an average of 3.17 quarters. Restructuring costs 
(RCPQ) is third at 47% and lasts an average of 3.47 quarters. In contrast, the other special items 
last less than two quarters, with the highest percentage of re-occurrence being 28%. Hence, the 
three special items that we classify as continuous are indeed more likely to occur consecutively 
than other special items.  
4.3 The Likelihood of Income Classification Shifting With/Without Continuous Special 
Items  
Once we classify special items into continuous (DOQ, AQP, and RCP) and non-continuous 
special items, we create two dummy variables. The variable for continuous special items 
(Con_Special) is set to 1 if a firm quarter has one or more of the three continuous special items 
(DOQ, AQP, and RCP), and zero otherwise. The dummy variable for non-continuous special items 
(NCon_Special) equals 1 if a firm quarter has one or more of the nine non-continuous special items. 
We adapt the logit model by Abernathy et al. (2014) to estimate a firm’s probability to shift after 
including the constraints and timing of real earnings management (REM), accrual earnings 
management (AEM), as well as other variables, as follows: 
Prob (Shift=1) = α0 + α1Con_Specialq + α2NCon_Specialq + α3Mean_Con_Specialq + 
α4Mean_NCon_Specialq + α5TaxRateq-1 + α6Zscoreq-1 + α7InstHoldingsq-1 + α8MktShareq-1 + 
α9BigNq + α10LongTenureq + α11SOXq + α12HighNOAq-1 + α13OpCycleq-1 + α14CFFq + 
α15LogAssetsq-1 + α16ROAq-1 + α17MtBq + α18PreREMq + α19PreAEMq + α20UnREMq + 
α21UnAEMq + Year Indicator + Industry Indicator  +  εq.          (2) 
We control for the dollar magnitude of a firm’s special items (Mean_Con_Special and 
Mean_NCon_Special) as the larger the values of special item(s), the more likely a firm can hide 
core expenses in special items to boost core earnings. Specifically, Mean_Con_Special and 
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Mean_NCon_Special is the mean of the firm quarter’s three continuous special items and nine 
non-continuous special items, respectively.  We control for factors that are considered constraints 
to real earnings management (Zang, 2012; Abernathy et al., 2014). TaxRate, or a firm’s effective 
tax rate, is total taxes paid divided by pre-tax income. Zscore is Altman’s Z-Score, used to proxy 
a firm’s financial health. InstHoldings, which represents institutional ownership, is the number of 
institutional shares divided by total shares outstanding. MktShare, or a firm’s percentage of 
industry sales, is the lagged total firm sales deflated by lagged industry (three-digit SIC code) total 
sales.  
We also control for factors that are deemed constraints to accrual earnings management 
(Zang, 2012; Abernathy et al., 2014). BigN is equal to one if a firm is audited by one of the Big N 
firms, and zero otherwise. LongTenure equals one if a firm has been audited by the same auditor 
for longer than the sample median of 8 years, and zero otherwise. SOX (Sarbanes Oxley Act) 
equals one if the fiscal year is after 2003, and zero otherwise. HighNOA equals one if the net 
operating assets at the beginning of the year divided by lagged sales is greater than the median of 
the corresponding industry-year, and zero otherwise. OpCycle, or the length of operating cycle, is 
the sum of the days receivable and days in inventory at the beginning of the year. CFF, cash flow 
forecast, equals one if a firm has an analyst’s cash flow forecast in IBES for that quarter, and zero 
otherwise.  
In addition, we control for firm characteristics that might affect the likelihood of 
classification shifting. LogAssets, the log value of lagged total assets, controls firm size. ROA, net 
income divided by total assets, controls firm performance. MtB, market-to-book ratio, is the log 
of the market value of equity divided by book value of equity. It is included to control for firm 
growth. 
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Finally, we include controls for the extent of income-increasing earnings management, 
which consists of both predicted and unexpected real earnings management (PredREM and 
UnREM, respectively) and predicted and unexpected accruals earnings management (PredAEM 
and UnREM, respectively). We estimate real earnings management (REM) by adapting the 
Roychowdhury (2006) regressions for discretionary expenses and production costs with quarterly 
data.  Specifically, we estimate abnormal discretionary expenses as the residual from the following 
equation: 
DISEXPq/Aq-1 = β0 + β1(1/Aq-1) + β2(SALESq-1/Aq-1) + εq,       (3)                  
where DISEXPq are quarter q discretionary expenditures, defined as the sum of advertising 
expenses, R&D expenses and SG&A expenses.13 
 We estimate abnormal production costs as the residual from the following equation: 
 PRODq/Aq-1 = β0 + β1(1/Aq-1) + β2(ΔSALESq/Aq-1) + β3(ΔSALESq-1/Aq-1) + εq,          (4)            
where PRODq is quarter q production cost, defined as the sum of costs of goods sold and change 
in inventory during the year. 
 We measure real earnings management (REM) by adding abnormal discretionary expenses 
multiplied by negative one to abnormal production costs. Following Abernathy et al. (2014), we 
compute predicted REM (PredREM) and unexpected REM (UnREM) as the predicted value and 
residual, respectively, from the following equation: 
REMq = β0 + β1TaxRateq-1 + β2Zscoreq-1 + β3InstHoldingsq-1 + β4MktShareq-1 + β5BigNq + 
β6LongTenureq + β7HighNOAq + β8OpCycleq-1 + β9LogAssetsq-1 + β10ROAq-1 + β11MtBq + 
β12CFFq + β13Earnq + β14Inverse_Millsq + εq.           (5)   
                                                          
13 We set advertising and R&D expenses to zero if they are missing, as long as SG&A expenses is available 
(Roychowdhury 2006). 
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where Earn is the earnings management goal control variable, which is quarter q earnings before 
extraordinary items minus discretionary accruals and production costs, plus discretionary 
expenditures, and Inverse_Mills is the inverse Mills ratio, which controls for potential sample 
selection bias.14 
To calculate the proxy for accruals management (AEM), we adopt the cross-sectional 
modified Jones model (Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney, 1995) adapted for quarterly data as in 
Matsumoto (2002) as follows: 
TAq/Aq-1 = β0(1/Aq-1) + β1(ΔSALESq/Aq-1) + β2(PPEq/Aq-1) + β3QTR4q + εq,    (6)                                   
where TAq is total accruals, defined as quarter q Δcurrent assets - Δcurrent liabilities – Δcash + 
Δshort-term debt – depreciation, Aq-1 is total assets in quarter q-1, ΔSALESq is the change in sales 
in quarter q, PPEq is gross property, plant, and equipment in quarter q, and QTR4 q is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if quarter q is the fourth fiscal quarter, 0 otherwise. We estimate equation (6) 
for each firm-year using all firm-quarters in that year from the same two-digit SIC code.15 The 
difference between actual total accruals and the estimated total accruals from the model is our 
measure for the discretionary accruals (AEM).  Consistent with Abernathy et al. (2014), we 
compute predicted AEM (PredAEM) and unexpected AEM (UnAEM) as the predicted value and 
residual, respectively, from the following equation: 
AEMq = β0 + β1TaxRateq-1 + β2Zscoreq-1 + β3InstHoldingsq-1 + β4MktShareq-1 + β5BigNq + 
β6LongTenureq + β7HighNOAq + β8OpCycleq-1 + β9LogAssetsq-1 + β10ROAq-1 + β11MtBq + 
β12CFFq + β13PreREMq +  β14UnREMq +  β15Inverse_Millsq  +  εq.         (7)        
                                                          
14 For brevity, we do not elaborate on the selection model for the Inverse Mills ratio. Please see Table 1 for the 
details. 
15 To be included in the sample, we require at least fifteen observations per industry-quarter. 
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In our main model, equation (2), we include both industry and year fixed effects and cluster 
the standard errors by time and firm to correct for cross-sectional and serial-correlation (Peterson 
2009). Consistent with our first hypothesis, in equation (2) we expect α1 > α2.  
4.4 The Likelihood of Income Classification Shifting and the Continuity of Special Items  
We hypothesize that firms with continuous special items are more likely to shift because 
the ability to shift consecutively would make it easier for them to maintain their boosted core 
earnings. To provide further evidence that it is the continuity of the special items, not merely the 
characteristics of continuous special items, that affects a firm’s shifting behavior (Givoly and Hayn 
1996; McVay 2006), we create an indicator variable (FIRST). This variable equals one for special 
items that are the first in a consecutive series of the same type of special item, and zero otherwise.16 
We also create an indicator variable (LAST) that equals one for special items that are the last in a 
consecutive series, and zero otherwise. We then expand our main model by interacting FIRST and 
LAST with Con_Special and NCon_Special. Specifically, we estimate the following logit model: 
Prob(Shift=1) = α0 + α1Con_Specialq + α2NCon_Specialq + α3Con_Specialq × FIRST + 
α4NCon_Specialq × FIRST + α5Con_Specialq × LAST + α6NCon_Specialq × LAST 
α7Mean_Con_Specialq + α8Mean_NCon_Specialq + α9TaxRateq-1 + α10Zscoreq-1 + 
α11InstHoldingsq-1 + α12MktShareq-1 + α13BigNq + α14LongTenureq + α15SOXq + α16HighNOAq-
1 + α17OpCycleq-1 +  α18CFFq + α19LogAssetsq-1 + α20ROAq-1 + α21MtBq + α22PreREMq + 
α23PreAEMq + α24UnREMq + α25UnAEMq + Year Indicator + Industry Indicator  +  εq.       (8)  
If the continuity of special items is an important factor in a firm’s decision to shift, we 
expect that the first continuous special item is more positively correlated with shifting than the 
first non-continuous special item. In other words, in accordance with H2-a, we expect α1 + α3 > α2 
                                                          
16 A series can be for one or more periods.  Therefore, some sample observations are classified as both the first and 
the last in a series. 
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+ α4. Also, we expect no significant difference in their correlations with shifting if the special items 
occur last. In other words, when special items discontinue in the next quarter(s), then whether the 
special item is a continuous or non-continuous type of special item does not make a difference in 
a firm’s decision to shift. Hence, we expect α1 + α5 = α2 + α6. 
 
5.  SAMPLE SELECTION AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
5.1 Sample Selection 
 We collect data for the fiscal years 1997 to 2016 from the Compustat Industrial Quarterly 
file, the I/B/E/S Split-Unadjusted file, the CRSP Monthly Return file, and the Thomas Reuters 
file.17  Consistent with prior research, we exclude firms in financial services (SIC 6000-6999) and 
utilities (SIC 4900-4999). We remove firm-quarter observations with annual sales of less than $1 
million to avoid creating outliers as a result of scaling variables by sales (McVay 2006; Fan et al. 
2010).  To ensure quarterly data are comparable across years, we eliminate firms that had a change 
in a fiscal year. We require at least 15 observations per industry-quarter to estimate expected core 
earnings.  Industries are classified based on Fama and French (1997). We delete firm-quarters with 
continuous and non-continuous special items in the same quarter. Finally, an observation must 
have non-missing information to measure the variables used in the applicable regression 
equation.18  The final sample consists of 27,465 firm-quarters (2,610 distinct firms), out of which 
4,080 firms-quarters (369 distinct firms) are classified as engaged in income classification shifting. 
Appendix 1 details our sample selection procedure.   
 
                                                          
17 We begin with 1997 because there were few observations for common shares issued for quarters (cshiq) in 
Compustat before 1997. This variable is used to generate the Inverse Mills ratio (Zang 2012; Abernathy et al., 
2014).  
18 For all special item related variables, we set any missing observation to zero.  
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5.2  Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A of Table 2 reports the selected descriptive statistics of the variables used in the 
main regression and Panel B of Table 2 provides selected descriptive statistics comparing firm-
quarter observations for shifters and non-shifters.  Panel B shows that 4,080 firm quarters are 
classified as shifters whereas 23,385 are categorized as non-shifters.  Shifters are significantly 
larger than non-shifters (mean of 6,021.94 million vs. mean of 4,035.07 million), consistent with 
McVay (2006).  Shifters also generate significantly higher sales than non-shifters (mean of 
1,148.62 million vs. mean of 911.43 million), even though they are less profitable than nonshifters 
in terms of ROA (mean of 0.07% vs. mean of 0.88%). As expected, shifters are more likely to have 
both continuous special items and non-continuous special items than nonshifters. On average, 45.8% 
of shifters vs. 23.0% of nonshifters have continuous special items; and 21.2% of shifters vs. 13.2% 
of nonshifters have non-continuous special items. Shifters also tend to have lower Altman's 
Zscores (mean of 2.023 vs. mean of 2.640), higher institutional holdings (mean of 67.9% vs. 
60.5%), larger market share (mean of 0.090 vs. 0.088), and longer operating cycles (mean of 
166.181 vs. 159.226). The percentage of shifters audited by BigN auditors is 90.4% vs. 86.3% for 
nonshifters. On average, the audit tenure is 11.909 years for shifters and 10.413 years for 
nonshifters. While 60% of the firm-quarters in the full sample come from the post SOX years, 
69.5% of the shifting quarters occur after SOX.  This is consistent with the observation that the 
greater scrutiny on financial reporting after SOX led firms to replace accruals management with 
other earnings management techniques, including income classification shifting (Kolev et al. 2008).  
Finally, the mean core earnings of shifters is significantly higher than that of non-shifters (mean 
of 0.153 vs. mean of 0.113).  
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Panel C of Table 2 reports the number and proportion of firm-quarters that are classified 
as shifters by year over the period that we analyze. The results indicate that the percentage of 
shifters hovered around 12% from 1997 to 2007 and increased steadily to 15% in 2008 and then 
to 25% in 2016. This pattern is consistent with the previous finding that accrual management 
activities declined in the post-SOX period whereas other earnings management activities, 
including classification shifting and real earnings management, went up (Cohen et al. 2008; Kolev 
et al. 2008). 
 Table 3 presents the Pearson/Spearman correlations for the variables used in the main test. 
Pearson correlations are above the diagonals and Spearman correlations are below the diagonals.  
Numbers in bold, bold italics and italics are significant at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level (two-tailed), 
respectively.  The results indicate that while both continuous special items and non-continuous 
special items are positively related to income classification shifting, the Pearson and Spearman 
correlation coefficients are larger between continuous special items and shifting than between non-
continuous special items and shifting (0.184 vs. 0.081). Interestingly, income classification 
shifting is also positively correlated with institutional holdings, BigN auditors, post-SOX period, 
and the issuance of cash flow forecasts.  This is consistent with prior findings that firms are more 
likely to use income classification under the heightened scrutiny of auditors and other market 
participants (Chung et al. 2002; Cohen et al. 2008; Roychowdhury 2006; Kolev et al. 2008; 
McInnis and Collins 2011). In addition, income classification shifting is positively associated with 
predicted REM and predicted AEM, suggesting that classification shifting and these two forms of 
earnings management are used jointly to manage earnings. At the same time, income classification 
shifting is negatively related with unpredicted REM and unpredicted AEM, implying that 
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classification shifting is less likely to be used when REM and AEM are unexpectedly high 
(Abernathy et al. 2014). 
 
6. MAIN RESULTS 
  Table 4 reports the results from the logistic regression of SHIFT on indicators of 
continuous and non-continuous special items (Con_Special and NCon_Special, respectively). We 
report z-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered by firm and quarter.  The coefficient 
on Con_Special is positive and significant (coefficient=1.136, z=14.95), suggesting that firms with 
continuous special items are more likely to shift than firms without continuous special items. 
Specifically, the odds ratio is 3.144, meaning that holding all other variables constant, the odds to 
shift is 214.4% higher for firm-quarters with continuous special than for those with no continuous 
special items.  The coefficient on NCon_Special is also positive and significant (coefficient=0.906, 
z=11.090), indicating that firms with non-continuous special items are more likely to shift than 
firms without special items.  Furthermore, the odds ratio is 2.474, meaning that holding all other 
variables constant, the odds to shift is 147.4% higher for firm-quarters with non-continuous special 
than for those with no special items. The results are consistent with McVay’s (2006)' finding that 
firms with special items are more likely to shift. Perhaps more importantly, the Wald-test shows 
that the coefficient for continuous special items α1 is significantly larger than the coefficient for 
non-continuous items α2 (χ2 (1) =10.70, p=0.001). This result supports Hypothesis H1 that firms 
are more likely to engage in income classification shifting when they have continuous special items 
than when they have non-continuous special items. The continuous special items may allow firms 
to reduce the potential cost of income classification shifting.   
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 The coefficients on the real earnings management constraints are generally consistent with 
expectations and prior studies. The positive and significant coefficients on the levels of both the 
continuous special items and non-continuous special items (coefficient=0.008, z=3.48, and 
coefficient=0.013, z=5.14, respectively) suggests that firms are more likely to classification shift 
when the magnitude of the special items is large. The coefficient of -0.025 on the Zscore is negative 
and significant (z=-1.79), which conveys that firms in poor financial condition are less likely to 
shift. Survey evidence in Graham et al. (2005) documents that when a firm is in bad financial shape, 
CFOs consider survival more important than reporting concerns.  The positive and significant 
coefficient of 0.412 on InstHoldings (z=3.56) implies that firms with greater institutional investor 
monitoring are more likely to resort to classification shifting.  Institutional owners are more likely 
to monitor firms’ real earnings manipulation (Bushee, 1998 and Roychowdhury 2006) due to long-
term economic consequences.  Thus, firms with more institutional ownership may be more likely 
to substitute real earnings management with classification shifting.  Finally, the coefficient on 
MktShare is negative and significant (coefficient=-0.436, z=-2.15).  Market leaders may see real 
earnings management as less costly because the reduction in their competitive advantage from 
deviating from optimal business strategies is relatively lower (Zang, 2012).  Hence, firms with 
higher market share may be less apt to engage in classification shifting versus real earnings 
management.   
 Turning to our results on accrual management constraints, we find the coefficient on SOX 
is positive (0.555) and significant (z=4.73), indicating that income classification shifting increases 
in the post SOX years, which witnessed a decline in accruals management (Cohen et al., 2008). 
The positive and significant coefficient of 0.132 on CFF (z=2.02) is consistent with the finding 
that firms reduce accruals manipulation in response to analysts’ provision of cash flow forecasts 
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and instead turn to other earnings management techniques including classification shifting 
(McInnis and Collins, 2011). Overall, the results suggest tightened regulation on financial 
reporting after SOX and greater transparency on accruals in the presence of analysts’ cash flow 
forecasts limited firms’ capacity to manipulate accruals and increased their propensity to 
classification shift.  
Table 5 presents the results of the logistic regression in which we interact continuous and 
non-continuous special items with a dummy variable that indicates whether it is the first (last) 
special item in a series of special items. We find that the coefficients on Con_Special and 
NCon_Special remain positive and significant (coefficient=1.114, z=14.47; and coefficient=0.916, 
z=7.72 respectively) and that the coefficient on Con_Special α1 is larger but now marginally more 
significant than the coefficient on NCon_Special α2 (χ2 (1) =3.27, p=0.070). These results indicate 
that the difference in propensity to classification shift between continuous and non-continuous 
special items is moderate when they both occur in the middle of a series of consecutive special 
items. The coefficient on Con_Special × First α3 is significantly positive (coefficient=0.245, 
z=3.56), whereas the coefficient on NCon_Special × First α4 is significantly negative 
(coefficient=-0.150, z=-1.93). The sum of the coefficients Con_Special + Con_Special × First (α1 
+ α3) is 1.359, which is significantly higher than the sum of the coefficients NCon_Special + 
NCon_Special × First (α2 + α4) of 0.766    (χ2 (1) =17.04, p=0.000).  These results suggest that 
firms are more likely to shift if a new special item is continuous. On the other hand, if the new 
special item is non-continuous, firms are not as likely to shift. Perhaps more telling is the 
interaction of continuous and non-continuous special items with the dummy variable LAST.  The 
coefficient on Con_Special × Last α5 is -0.020 and the coefficient on NCon_Special × Last α6 is 
0.006. Neither is statistically significant (z=-0.23 and z=0.07, respectively). The sum of the 
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coefficients Con_Special + Con_Special × Last (α1 + α5) is 1.094, which is not significantly 
different from the sum of the coefficients NCon_Special + NCon_Special × Last (α2 + α6) of 0.922  
(χ2 (1) =0.11, p=0.739).  In other words, there is little difference in the likelihood to shift when 
neither type of special item will reoccur in the next quarter. These results provide evidence in 
support of our conjecture that the continuity of special items plays a significant role in firms’ 
decision to shift income. 
 
7. ADDITIONAL TEST – ALTERNATIVE CONTROLS FOR REM AND AEM 
 In our main analysis, we follow Abernathy et al. (2014) and control real earnings 
management and accruals management using their predicted and unpredicted values. In a 
robustness test, we replace these values with the raw values of REM and AEM. Specifically, 
POS_REM is income increasing real earnings management in quarter q, calculated as the sum of 
abnormal discretionary expenses multiplied by negative one and abnormal production costs 
(Cohen and Zarowin, 2010). POS_AEM is income increasing discretionary accruals in quarter q, 
measured using the cross-sectional modified Jones model (Dechow, et al. 1995) adapted for 
quarterly data as in Matsumoto (2002).  We run the tests with both the main logistic regression 
model and the regression model with interactions. The untabulated results are qualitatively similar 
and the conclusions are unaltered.   
 
8. CONCLUSIONS 
Prior literature has documented large sample evidence of income classification shifting. 
However, there is little discussion on the potential costs of classification shifting and its 
implications on firms’ decisions to engage in classification shifting.  As much as  classification 
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shifting can assist in firms’ meeting or beating analysts’ benchmarks in the current quarter, there 
will be a greater chance to miss them in quarter q+1, which can be the potential cost of income 
classification shifting.  
If managers weigh the costs and benefits of income classification shifting, they are more 
likely to engage in classification shifting when they have certain special items that can allow them 
to reduce the cost of classification shifting by shifting income across quarters. It is important to 
consider both potential costs and benefits of income classification shifting to understand firms’ 
motivation to engage in classification shifting and to assess the likelihood of classification shifting.  
Nevertheless, there has been a lack of discussion on the potential costs of classification shifting 
and their implication in firms’ decisions on income shifting. We fill this gap in our study.   
We document that firms are likely to engage in income classification shifting when they 
can reduce the costs of classification shifting by shifting their income consecutively using 
continuous special items.  Also, firms are more likely to shift their earnings when special items 
appear first in a series of continuous special items rather than first in a series of non-continuous 
special items. The results suggest that the potential costs of classification shifting affect firms’ 
decisions on income classification shifting.  
Given the significant increase in the reporting of special items over time (Elliott and Hanna 
1996; Donelson et al. 2011; Cain et al. 2019), it is important for users of financial statements to 
understand the implications of special items and circumstances that affect the likelihood of income 
classification shifting. Our results convey that the continuity of special items plays a significant 
role in firms’ decision to engage in income classification shifting, which can help users of financial 
statements evaluate the likelihood of classification shifting and the quality of earnings.  
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An issue worth mentioning is that whether a special item is consecutive or non-consecutive, 
it will eventually end.  However, if a special item lasts for a few quarters, shifting earlier in the 
series would allow management to increase core earnings while buying some time. Management 
may expect its firm’s future core earnings to improve or it may find other ways to increase core 
earnings in the future, such as shifting future special items. 
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Appendix 1. Sample Selection Criteria and Procedures  
 
Selection 
Criteria               Observations 
Total number of US firm-quarters in Compustat from 1997 to 2016          922,164  
Less: number of firm-quarters in financial services and utilities   158,016         764,148  
Less: number of firm-quarters with annual sales of less 
than $1 million  
 
  212,752         551,396  
Less: number of firm-quarters that had a change in fiscal 
year end 
 
      1,929         549,467  
Less: number of firm-quarters with missing current quarter or lagged 
accounting variables for the core earnings regression 
  352,459         197,008  
Less: number of firm-quarters with missing return data on CRSP     74,401         122,607  
Less: number of firm-quarters in an industry with less than 15 
observations 
      7,032         115,575  
Less: number of firms-quarters with missing I/B/E/S data     36,826           78,749  
Less: number of firm-quarters with missing institutional ownership 
data 
      8,576           70,173  
Less: number of firm-quarters with missing current quarter or lagged 
accounting variables for the logistic regression 
    36,162           34,011  
Less: number of firm-quarters with both continuous and non-
continuous special items in the same quarter 
      6,546  
 
 
Final sample                 27,465  
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Appendix 2. Continuity of Special Items  
 










Continue in the 
Following 















(1) SPIQ  88,802  34,048  38%  2.54 
(2) DOQ  15,127  10,630  70%  5.91 
(3) AQPQ  13,607  6,819  50%  3.17 
(4) RCPQ  20,932  9,918  47%  3.47 
(5) SPIOPQ  21,363  6,023  28%  1.70 
(6) DTEPQ  18,644  5,113  27%  1.58 
(7) RRPQ  5,742  1,470  26%  1.60 
(8) SETPQ  16,277  4,072  25%  1.61 
(9) GLPQ  19,035  4,384  23%  1.43 
(10) WDPQ  22,384  4,222  19%  1.33 
(11) RDIPQ  2,412  449  19%  1.30 
(12) XIQ  8,649  1,434  17%  1.31 
(13) GDWLIPQ  10,669  1,182  11%  1.16 
Appendix 2 presents the count of firm-quarters with new special items, the count and percent of those 
firm-quarters that continue to have the same type of special item in the following quarter(s), and the 
average number of quarters that a new special item lasts. The sample period is 1997-2016. A firm quarter 
is deemed to have new special items if there are no special items in the previous quarter. SPIQ is unusual 
or nonrecurring items, including any item(s) from (3)-(13), DOQ is gain or loss from discontinued 
operations, AQPQ is acquisitions and mergers, RCPQ is restructuring costs, SPIOPQ is other special 
items, DTEPQ is extinguishment of debt, RRPQ is reversal of restructuring and acquisition costs, 
SETPQ is the sum of all settlement special items, GLPQ is gain or loss on sale of assets, WDPQ is asset 
write-downs, RDIPQ is in-process R&D expense, XIQ is extraordinary items, and GDWLIPQ is 
goodwill impairments.  
  







Definition (Compustat variables in parentheses) 
CEq = core earnings for quarter q, calculated as sales (saleq) - cost of goods sold (cogsq) - selling, 
general, and administrative expenses (xsgaq), scaled by sales (saleq). 
UE_CEq = unexpected core earnings for quarter q, calculated as the difference between reported core 
earnings and predicted core earnings (CEq), estimated from the following model by 
industry-quarter, excluding firm i: CEq = β0 + β1CEq-1 + β2CEq-4 + β3ATOq + β4ACCRq-1 + 
β5ACCRq-4 + β6ΔSALESq + β7NEG_ΔSALESq + β8RETq + β9RETq-1 + εq.  
ATOq = asset turnover ratio for quarter q, calculated as Salesq/((NOAq+NOAq-1)/2), where NOAq(q-
1), or net operating assets, is operating assets minus operating liabilities at the end of quarter 
q (q-1). Operating assets is calculated as total assets (atq) less cash and short-term 
investments (cheq). Operating liabilities is calculated as total assets (atq) less total debt 
(sum of dlcq and dlttq), less book value of common and preferred equity (sum of pstkq and 
cstkq), less minority interest (mibq). Average NOA, or (NOAq + NOAq-1)/2, is required to 
be positive.  
ACCRq = operating accruals for quarter q, calculated as income before extraordinary items (ibq) 
minus cash from operations (oancfy), scaled by sales (salesq). 
ΔSALESq = percentage change in sales for quarter q, calculated as (salesq - salesq-4)/salesq-4. 
NEG_ΔSALESq = ΔSALESq if the quarter q change in sales is less than 0, and 0 otherwise. 
RETq = three-month CRSP value-weighted market-adjusted return exclusive of dividends, 
corresponding to the fiscal quarter. 
SHIFTq = 1 if a firm has positive unexpected core earnings in quarter q (UE_CEq) and its I/B/E/S 
earnings are greater than GAAP basic earnings in quarter q, 0 otherwise. 
Con_Specialq = 1 if a firm quarter has at least one of the continuous special items DOQ, AQP, or RCP, and 
0 otherwise.  
NCon_Specialq = 1 if a firm quarter has one or more of the non-continuous special items SPIOPQ, DTEPQ, 
RRPQ, SETPQ, GLPQ, WDPQ, RDIPQ, XIQ, or GDWLIPQ, and 0 otherwise.  
Mean_Con_Speicalq = the average value of firm’s three continuous special items in quarter q. 
Mean_NCon_Speicalq = the average value of firm’s nine non-continuous special items in quarter q. 
TaxRateq = tax rate for quarter q, calculated as total taxes paid divided by pre-tax net income (txtq/piq) 
and constrained to be between 0 and 100 percent. 
Zscoreq-1 = Altman's Z-Score for quarter q, calculated as 
Zscore=3.3*(niq/atq)+1.0*(salq/atq)+1.4*(req/atq)+1.2*(wcapq/atq)+0.6*(cshoq*prccq/ltq) 
InstHoldingsq = institutional ownership for quarter q, calculated as the number of common shares held by 
institutions divided by total common shares (cshoq) at the end of quarter q. 
MktShareq = market share in quarter q, calculated as a firm's total sales (saleq) divided by the industry 
(three-digit SIC code) total sales. 
BigNq = 1 if a firm is audited by a Big N audit firm, and 0 otherwise. 
LongTenureq = 1 if a firm's audit tenure is greater than 7 years (sample median for audit tenure), 0 
otherwise. 
SOXq = 1 for a fiscal year after 2003, and 0 otherwise. 
HighNOAq = 1 if a firm's net operating assets (NOA) is greater than the industry median in quarter q, 0 
otherwise. NOAq = (seqq-cheq+dlttq+dlcq)/saleq. 
OpCycleq = operating cycle, calculated as the days receivable plus days in inventory for year t. Days 
receivable is 360/[salet/(rect+rect-1)/2]; days in inventory is 360/[cogst/(invtt+invtt-1)/2]. 
CFFq = 1 if a firm has I/B/E/S analysts' cash flow forecasts for quarter q, and 0 otherwise. 
LogAssetsq = log of assets for quarter q, calculated as log of total assets (atq). 
ROAq = return on assets for quarter q, calculated as net income (niq) divided by total assets (atq). 
MtBq = natural log of the market-to-book ratio, calculated as the log of the market value of equity 
(prccq*cshoq) divided by book value of equity (ceqq). 
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Definition (Compustat variables in parentheses) 
Inverse_Millsq = Inverse Mills ratio calculated as follows (Abernathy et al., 2014; Zang 2012):  
JustBeatq = β0 + β1NumberBeatq + β2Issueq+1 + β3MtBq-1 + β4Sharesq + β5LNanalysq + β6ROAq-1 
+ Year +  εq,  
where JustBeat=1 if a firm's earnings before extraordinary items over lagged assets is between 0 
and 0.005, or its change in basic EPS excluding extraordinary items from the same quarter of the 
prior year is between 0 and 2 cents, or actual EPS less the last analyst consensus forecast before 
the fiscal quarter end is between 0 and 1 cent, 0 otherwise; NumberBeat is number of times in 
the previous 4 quarters that firm JustBeat; Issue=1 if a firm issues equity in the next quarter, 0 
otherwise; MtB is as defined in this table; shares is natural log of the number of shares 
outstanding(cshoq); LNanalys is the log of the number of analysts following the firm, and ROA 
is defined in this table. 
Earnq = earnings before extraordinary items minus discretionary accruals and production costs, plus 
discretionary expenditures, for quarter q.  
REMq = real earnings management in quarter q, calculated as the sum of abnormal discretionary expenses 
multiplied by negative one and abnormal production costs (Cohen and Zarowin, 2010). 
PredREMq = predicted real earnings management, calculated as follows: 
REMq = β0 + β1TaxRateq-1 + β2Zscoreq-1 + β3InstHoldingsq-1 + β4MktShareq-1 + β5BigNq + 
β6LongTenureq + β7HighNOAq + β8OpCycleq-1 + β9LogAssetsq-1 + β10ROAq-1 + β11MtBq +  
β12CFFq +  β13Earnq +  β14Inverse_Millsq  +  εq.  
The variables are defined in this table. 
UnREMq = unexpected real earnings management, which is the residual εq from the model that generates 
PredREMq.  
POS_REMq = income increasing real earnings management in quarter q, calculated as the sum of abnormal 
discretionary expenses multiplied by negative one and abnormal production costs (Cohen and 
Zarowin, 2010). 
AEMq = discretionary accruals in quarter q, measured as the residuals from the cross-sectional modified 
Jones model (Dechow, et al. 1995) adapted for quarterly data as in Matsumoto (2002). 
PredAEMq = predicted discretionary accruals, calculated as follows: 
AEMq = β0 + β1TaxRateq-1 + β2Zscoreq-1 + β3InstHoldingsq-1 + β4MktShareq-1 + β5BigNq + 
β6LongTenureq + β7HighNOAq + β8OpCycleq-1 + β9LogAssetsq-1 + β10ROAq-1 + β11MtBq +  
β12CFFq + β13PreREMq + β14UnREMq +  β15Inverse_Millsq  +  εq.  
The variables are defined in this table. 
UnAEMq = unexpected discretionary accruals, which is the residual εq from the model that generates 
PredAEMq. 
POS_AEMq = income increasing discretionary accruals in quarter q, measured using the cross-sectional 
modified Jones model (Dechow, et al. 1995) adapted for quarterly data as in Matsumoto (2002). 
FIRST = 1 if the special item appears first in a string of consecutive special items of the same type and 0 
otherwise. 








Panel A: Descriptive Statistics  
Variable  Mean  Median  
Standard 
Deviation  25%  75% 
Shiftq  0.149  0.000  0.356  0.000  0.000 
Con_Specialq  0.263  0.000  0.441  0.000  1.000 
Ncon_Specialq  0.144  0.000  0.351  0.000  0.000 
TaxRateq-1  0.307  0.348  0.170  0.250  0.385 
Zscoreq-1  2.619  1.982  4.735  1.212  3.070 
InstHoldingsq-1  0.612  0.670  0.289  0.396  0.839 
MktShareq-1  0.088  0.018  0.166  0.004  0.086 
BigNq  0.869  1.000  0.338  1.000  1.000 
LongTenureq  0.472  0.000  0.499  0.000  1.000 
SOXq  0.600  1.000  0.490  0.000  1.000 
HighNOAq-1  0.704  1.000  0.456  0.000  1.000 
OpCycleq-1  159.440  150.786  84.352  104.560  202.321 
CFFq  0.370  0.000  0.483  0.000  1.000 
LogAssetsq-1  6.633  6.576  1.766  5.407  7.786 
ROAq-1  0.006  0.012  0.044  0.002  0.022 
BtMq  0.755  0.709  0.822  0.247  1.199 
PredREMq  0.022  0.013  0.145  -0.049  0.086 
PredAEMq  -0.018  -0.021  0.415  -0.150  0.118 
UnREMq  0.011  0.006  0.268  -0.092  0.103 
UnAEMq  0.030  0.033  0.439  -0.102  0.170 
CEq   0.119   0.122   0.213   0.064   0.189 
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Table 2 (Continued) 






p-value for statistical 
difference 








6,021.94  1,135.48  4,035.07    573.99  <0.001 <0.001 
Saleq(in millions) 
 
1,148.62     306.26  
 





5,271.62   1,427.65  
 






































































































  0.153 0.138   0.113 0.119   <0.001 <0.001 
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Table 2 (Continued) 
Panel C:  Income Classification Shifting Firm-Quarters by Year 
     SHIFT  
Fiscal Year  






1997                      321   42 13%  
1998                   1,919   240 13%  
1999                   2,801   264 9%  
2000                   2,374   283 12%  
2001                   1,228   149 12%  
2002                   1,174   138 12%  
2003                   1,175   127 11%  
2004                   1,141   123 11%  
2005                   1,188   140 12%  
2006                   1,195   135 11%  
2007                   1,211   126 10%  
2008                   1,235   180 15%  
2009                   1,355   233 17%  
2010                   1,369   228 17%  
2011                   1,325   234 18%  
2012                   1,233   245 20%  
2013                   1,274   269 21%  
2014                   1,252   249 20%  
2015                   1,291   331 26%  
2016                   1,404   344 25%  
No. of Obs                   27,465    4,080 15%    
See Table 1 for variable definitions. The full sample consists of 27,465 firm-quarter observations. Panel A 
reports the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the main analysis. Panel B compares firm 
characteristics in the earnings management subgroups.  In panels A and B, all variables, except indicator 
variables, are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Panel C tabulates the number of firm-quarters and 
percentage of firm-quarters that contain shifted core earnings. 
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 Table 3 
 Pearson (Spearman) Correlation Matrix 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
(1) Shiftq 1.000 0.184 0.081 -0.025 -0.043 0.096 0.005 0.043 0.046 0.081 
(2) Con_Specialq 0.184 1.000 -0.245 -0.030 -0.063 0.215 0.068 0.028 0.115 0.300 
(3) NCon_Specialq 0.081 -0.245 1.000 -0.027 -0.028 0.057 -0.011 0.007 -0.007 0.123 
(4) TaxRateq-1 -0.044 -0.087 -0.034 1.000 0.047 0.109 0.079 0.069 0.040 -0.074 
(5) Zscoreq-1 -0.088 -0.073 -0.080 0.085 1.000 0.019 -0.008 0.000 -0.004 -0.053 
(6) InstHoldingsq-1 0.100 0.232 0.058 0.024 0.127 1.000 0.169 0.238 0.223 0.366 
(7) MktShareq-1 0.032 0.117 0.005 0.151 0.066 0.333 1.000 0.129 0.137 0.050 
(8) BigNq 0.043 0.028 0.007 0.059 0.007 0.224 0.265 1.000 0.192 -0.160 
(9) LongTenureq 0.046 0.115 -0.007 -0.003 0.112 0.212 0.229 0.192 1.000 0.125 
(10) SOXq 0.081 0.300 0.123 -0.153 0.018 0.399 0.072 -0.160 0.125 1.000 
(11) HighNOAq-1 0.079 0.082 0.015 0.084 0.036 0.324 0.363 0.334 0.156 -0.094 
(12) OpCycleq-1 0.017 0.008 -0.063 -0.167 0.102 -0.089 -0.202 -0.088 -0.031 -0.118 
(13) CFFq 0.111 0.184 0.111 -0.066 -0.022 0.383 0.187 0.124 0.129 0.426 
(14) LogAssetsq-1 0.148 0.237 0.098 0.025 -0.055 0.546 0.594 0.334 0.283 0.309 
(15) ROAq-1 -0.095 -0.052 -0.036 0.101 0.554 0.146 0.209 0.084 0.102 0.053 
(16) MtBq -0.006 0.026 -0.006 -0.098 0.386 0.141 0.085 0.070 0.057 0.116 
(17) PredREMq 0.135 0.157 0.073 -0.055 -0.112 0.201 0.119 0.063 0.092 0.213 
(18) PredAEMq 0.106 0.048 0.064 -0.022 -0.044 -0.004 -0.007 0.010 0.038 0.031 
(19) UnREMq -0.072 0.000 -0.046 -0.004 0.041 -0.036 -0.050 -0.024 -0.018 -0.027 
(20) UnAEMq -0.098 -0.033 -0.056 0.003 0.057 0.007 0.012 -0.011 -0.019 -0.017 
 
  (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
(1) Shiftq 0.079 0.013 0.111 0.143 -0.049 -0.002 0.115 0.081 -0.042 -0.065 
(2) Con_Specialq 0.082 -0.008 0.184 0.231 -0.019 0.028 0.118 0.018 0.024 0.005 
(3) NCon_Specialq 0.015 -0.060 0.111 0.096 -0.006 -0.003 0.075 0.060 -0.042 -0.052 
(4) TaxRateq-1 0.116 -0.129 -0.011 0.113 0.230 -0.080 -0.015 -0.016 -0.001 -0.001 
(5) Zscoreq-1 -0.006 0.064 -0.044 -0.072 0.165 0.209 -0.036 0.023 -0.013 -0.025 
(6) InstHoldingsq-1 0.342 -0.122 0.359 0.526 0.156 0.130 0.153 -0.013 -0.014 0.017 
(7) MktShareq-1 0.213 -0.119 0.118 0.370 0.094 0.082 0.018 0.007 -0.003 0.001 
(8) BigNq 0.334 -0.109 0.124 0.326 0.082 0.065 0.042 -0.009 -0.020 0.002 
(9) LongTenureq 0.156 -0.041 0.129 0.287 0.083 0.056 0.067 0.008 0.007 0.008 
(10) SOXq -0.094 -0.119 0.426 0.308 0.038 0.108 0.164 0.000 0.019 0.024 
(11) HighNOAq-1 1.000 -0.043 0.170 0.546 0.128 0.071 0.139 -0.028 -0.031 0.019 
(12) OpCycleq-1 -0.040 1.000 -0.128 -0.222 -0.100 -0.019 0.007 0.003 -0.009 0.002 
(13) CFFq 0.170 -0.124 1.000 0.520 0.064 0.117 0.072 -0.015 0.022 0.029 
(14) LogAssetsq-1 0.563 -0.209 0.527 1.000 0.185 0.124 0.231 -0.027 -0.017 0.031 
(15) ROAq-1 0.129 -0.064 0.079 0.151 1.000 0.090 0.069 0.025 -0.004 -0.011 
(16) MtBq 0.080 -0.020 0.124 0.145 0.380 1.000 -0.041 0.047 -0.027 -0.023 
(17) PredREMq 0.197 -0.006 0.089 0.318 -0.084 -0.039 1.000 0.809 -0.140 0.002 
(18) PredAEMq -0.022 -0.026 0.001 0.013 -0.109 0.106 0.659 1.000 -0.448 -0.027 
(19) UnREMq -0.046 0.013 -0.001 -0.083 0.060 -0.046 -0.208 -0.404 1.000 -0.004 
(20) UnAEMq 0.020 0.013 0.017 -0.003 0.120 -0.076 -0.250 -0.426 0.178 1.000 
See Table 1 for variable definitions. There are 27,465 firm-quarter observations. Pearson (Spearman) correlations 
are above (below) the diagonal. All variables except indicator variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th percentiles. 
Numbers in bold, bold italics and italics are significant at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level (two-tailed), respectively. 
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Table 4 
Logistic Analysis of the Probability of Classification Shifting with Continuous and Non-
Continuous Special Items 
Independent  




Coefficient   
Cluster  
Robust z-Stat   
p-value 
(one-tailed) 
Interceptq   -3.718  -11.19  0.000 
Con_Specialq  + 1.136  14.95  0.000 
NCon_Specialq  + 0.906  11.09  0.000 
Mean_Con_Specialq  + 0.008  3.48  0.001 
Mean_NCon_Specialq  + 0.013  5.14  0.000 
TaxRateq-1  + -0.097  -0.70  0.483 
Zscoreq-1  ? -0.025  -1.79  0.073 
InstHoldingsq-1  ? 0.412  3.56  0.000 
MktShareq-1  - -0.436  -2.15  0.031 
BigNq  ? 0.089  1.13  0.260 
LongTenureq  ? -0.030  -0.58  0.560 
SOXq  ? 0.555  4.73  0.000 
HighNOAq-1  + -0.009  -0.11  0.913 
OpCycleq-1  - 0.001  1.61  0.107 
CFFq  + 0.132  2.02  0.043 
LogAssetsq-1  ? 0.148  4.22  0.000 
ROAq-1  ? -2.881  -4.30  0.000 
MtBq  ? -0.070  -1.62  0.106 
PredREMq  - 0.264  1.07  0.285 
PredAEMq  - 0.269  0.40  0.692 
UnREMq  - -0.293  -4.50  0.000 
UnAEMq  - -0.157  -1.08  0.281 
Industry Effects     Yes   
Year Effects     Yes   
No. of Obs.     27,465   
Psuedo-R2     10.79%   
Test of α1>α2   χ2(1) =10.70, p=0.001   
Table 4 presents the results of  estimating equation (2) as follows: 
(Prob Shift=1) = α0 + α1Con_Specialq + α2NCon_Specialq + α3Mean_Con_Specialq + 
α4Mean_NCon_Specialq + α5-8 REM Constraints + α9-14AEM Constrains + α15-17 Controls + εq. 
 
See Table 1 for variable definitions. REM is real earnings management and AEM is accrual earnings 
management.  z-statistics are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm and quarter. All variables 
except indicator variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  
  
 44  
 
Table 5 
Logistic Analysis of the Probability of Classification Shifting for First and Last Continuous and Non-
Continuous Special Items  
Independent  




Coefficient   
Cluster  
Robust z-Stat   
p-value 
(One-tailed) 
Interceptq   -3.713  -11.14  0.000 
Con_Specialq  + 1.114  14.47  0.000 
Ncon_Specialq  + 0.916  7.72  0.000 
Con_Specialq × FIRST  + 0.245  3.56  0.000 
Ncon_Specialq × FIRST  - -0.150  -1.93  0.054 
Con_Specialq × LAST  - -0.020  -0.23  0.821 
Ncon_Specialq × LAST  - 0.006  0.07  0.942 
Mean_Con_Specialq  + 0.007  3.38  0.001 
Mean_NCon_Specialq  + 0.013  5.21  0.000 
TaxRateq-1  + -0.097  -0.70  0.482 
Zscoreq-1  ? -0.026  -1.80  0.071 
InstHoldingsq-1  ? 0.411  3.53  0.000 
MktShareq-1  - -0.435  -2.14  0.033 
BigNq  ? 0.086  1.08  0.279 
LongTenureq  ? -0.028  -0.55  0.581 
SOXq  ? 0.555  4.52  0.000 
HighNOAq-1  + -0.009  -0.11  0.911 
OpCycleq-1  - 0.001  1.62  0.106 
CFFq  + 0.141  2.14  0.033 
LogAssetsq-1  ? 0.147  4.20  0.000 
ROAq-1  ? -2.908  -4.32  0.000 
MtBq  ? -0.069  -1.58  0.114 
PredREMq  - 0.248  0.99  0.321 
PredAEMq  - 0.320  0.46  0.643 
UnREMq  - -0.293  -4.51  0.000 
UnAEMq  - -0.167  -1.14  0.254 
Industry Effects     Yes   
Year Effects     Yes   
No. of Obs.     27,465   
Psuedo-R2     10.85%   
Test of α1>α2   χ2(1) =3.27  p=0.070   
Test of α1+α3>α2 +α4   χ2(1) =17.04 p=0.000   
Test of α1+α5>α2 +α6   χ2(1) =0.11  p=0.739   
Table 5 presents the results of  estimating equation (8) as follows: 
Prob(Shift=1) = α0 + α1Con_Specialq + α2NCon_Specialq + α3Con_Specialq × FIRST + α4NCon_Specialq × 
FIRST + α5Con_Specialq × LAST + α6NCon_Specialq × LAST + α7Mean_Con_Specialq + 
α8Mean_NCon_Specialq + α9-12 REM Constraints + α13-18AEM Constrains + α19-25Controls  +  εq.    
 
See Table 1 for variable definitions.  REM is real earnings management and AEM is accrual earnings 
management.  z-statistics are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm and quarter. All variables except 
indicator variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  
 
